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Abstract
In the context of data-mining competitions (e.g., Kaggle, KDDCup, ILSVRC Challenge [7]), we show
how access to an oracle that reports a contestant’s log-loss score on the test set can be exploited to deduce
the ground-truth of some of the test examples. By applying this technique iteratively to batches of m
examples (for small m), all of the test labels can eventually be inferred. In this paper, (1) We demonstrate
this attack on the first stage of a recent Kaggle competition (Intel & MobileODT Cancer Screening) and
use it to achieve a log-loss of 0.00000 (and thus attain a rank of #4 out of 848 contestants), without
ever training a classifier to solve the actual task. (2) We prove an upper bound on the batch size m as
a function of the floating-point resolution of the probability estimates that the contestant submits for
the labels. (3) We derive, and demonstrate in simulation, a more flexible attack that can be used even
when the oracle reports the accuracy on an unknown (but fixed) subset of the test set’s labels. These
results underline the importance of evaluating contestants based only on test data that the oracle does
not examine.
1 Introduction
Data-mining competitions such as those as offered by Kaggle, KDD Cup, and other organizations, have
become a mainstay of machine learning. By establishing common rules of participation as well as train-
ing and testing datasets that are shared by all contestants, these competitions can help to advance the
state-of-the-art of machine learning practice in a variety of application domains. In order for the scientific
results of these contests to have value, however, it is imperative that the methods by which candidates
are evaluated be sound. The importance of fair evaluation is made more pressing by the availability of
oracles, often provided by the organizers of the competitions themselves, that return the accuracy or loss
value of the contestant’s guesses with respect to the test labels. The purpose of such oracles is to help
participants to pursue more promising algorithmic strategies and to improve the overall quality of contes-
tants’ submissions. But they also open up the possibility of systematic overfitting, either inadvertently
or maliciously.
In this paper, we consider how an oracle that returns the log loss of a contestant’s guesses w.r.t. the
ground-truth labels of a test set, can be exploited by an attacker to infer the test set’s true labels. The
log-loss is mathematically convenient because, unlike other metrics such as the AUC [8, 1], which is
calculated over pairs of examples, the log-loss can be computed for each example separately. Moreover,
unlike the 0-1 loss that conveys only the number of correctly labeled examples, the log-loss measures how
“close” the contestant’s guesses are to ground-truth. The attack proposed in our paper can be effective
despite limited floating-point resolution in the oracle’s return values, and can be applied even if the
oracle only computes the log-loss on an unknown (but fixed) subset of the test set. In a case study we
performed for this paper, we applied the attack to achieve a perfect score on a recent Kaggle competition
(Intel & MobileODT Cervical Cancer Screening), thereby attaining a rank on the first-stage competition
leaderboard of #4 out of 848. To be fair, Kaggle had structured their competition rules such that the first
stage was mostly for informational purposes to let contestants know how their algorithmic approachs were
faring compared to their contestants’. However, even a temporary high ranking in a data-mining contest
could conceivably hold ancillary value, e.g., by inducing a potential employer or recruiter to take a look
at a particular person’s curriculum vitae. In any case, the potential of exploiting a competition oracle
underlines the importance of employing commonsense safeguards to preserve the integrity of contestant
rankings. In particular, the results in this paper suggest that evaluation of contestants’ performance
should be done strictly on test examples on which the oracle never reported accuracy.
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1.1 Related work
Both intentional hacking [9, 2, 10] and inadvertent overfitting [4, 5] to test data in adaptive data analyses
– including but not limited to data-mining competitions – has generated recent research interest in the
privacy-preserving machine learning and computational complexity theory communities. Blum and Hardt
[2] recently described a “boosting” attack with which a contestant can estimate the test labels such that,
with probability 2/3, their accuracy w.r.t. the ground truth is better than chance. They also proposed
a “Ladder” mechanism that can be used to rank contestants’ performance and that is robust to such
attacks. In addition, in our own prior work [9], we showed how an oracle that reports the AUC can be
used to infer the ground-truth of a few of the test labels with complete certainty.
2 Notation and Assumptions
We assume that the test set contains n examples, each of which belongs to one of c possible classes.
We represent the ground-truth of the entire test set using a row-wise 1-hot matrix Yn ∈ {0, 1}n×c,
where Yn
.
= [y1, . . . ,yn]
>, each yi = [yi1, . . . , yic]>, each yij ∈ {0, 1}, and ∑j yij = 1 for each i.
Similarly, we represent the contestant’s guesses using matrix Ŷn ∈ Rn×c, where Ŷn .= [ŷ1, . . . , ŷn]>,
each ŷi = [ŷi1, . . . , ŷic], each ŷij ∈ (0, 1), and ∑j ŷij = 1 for each i. The loss function that we study
in this paper is the log-loss, computed by function f , of the contestant’s guesses with respect to the
ground-truth:
`n = f(Yn, Ŷn) = − 1
n
n∑
i=1
c∑
j=1
yij log ŷij (1)
We assume that the data-mining competition offers an oracle to which a contestant can submit her/his
real-valued guesses for the test labels and obtain the log-loss `n of the guesses with respect to the
ground-truth.
3 Example
To show how knowledge of the log-loss can reveal information about the ground-truth itself, consider
a tiny test set in which there are just 2 examples and 3 classes, and suppose a contestant submits the
following guesses to the oracle (where e is the base of the natural logarithm):
Ŷ2 =
[
e−2 e−1 1− e−2 − e−1
e−8 e−4 1− e−8 − e−4
]
If the oracle reports that the log-loss of the contestant’s guesses, with respect to the ground-truth, is 3,
then the ground-truth labeling of these two examples must be
Y2 =
[
1 0 0
0 1 0
]
since this is the only value of Y2 that satisfies
f(Y2, Ŷ2) = −1
2
2∑
i=1
3∑
j=1
yij log ŷij = 3
4 Problem formulation and proposed solution
Here we describe an attack (summarized in Algorithm 1) with which a contestant can iteratively (in
batches) infer the ground-truth of the test set while simultaneously improving (usually) her/his standing
on the competition leaderboard. For simplicity of notation (and without loss of generality), we assume
that the examples in the test set are ordered such that (1) the labels of the first k examples have already
been inferred; (2) the labels of the next m examples (which we call the probed examples) are to be
inferred in the current round; and (3) the rest (n −m − k) of the test labels will uninferred during the
current round.
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Since f is summed over all n examples, it can be re-written as
`n
.
= f(Yn, Ŷn) = − 1
n
[
k∑
i=1
∑
j
yij log ŷij +
k+m∑
i=k+1
∑
j
yij log ŷij +
n∑
i=k+m+1
∑
j
yij log ŷij
]
(2)
Assuming the first k examples have already been inferred correctly so that ŷij = yij for each j and each
i ≤ k, then the first term in the RHS of Equation 2 is approximately 0.1 Moreover, if we set ŷij to 1/c
for each j and each i = k+m+ 1, . . . , n, then the third term in the RHS equals −1× (n−m− k)× log c.
The log-loss `m due to just the m probed examples is thus:
`m
.
=
1
m
k+m∑
i=k+1
∑
j
yij log ŷij
=
1
m
((n−m− k) log c− n× `n) (3)
Given knowledge of `m – which can be calculated from the value `n returned by the oracle – and
given knowledge of [ŷk+1, . . . , ŷk+m]
> – which the candidate her/himself controls – the ground-truth of
the m examples can be inferred using exhaustive search over all possible cm labelings (for small m). Over
dn/me consecutive rounds, we can determine the ground-truth values of all of the test labels.
Algorithm 1 Infer the ground-truth of the test set using the oracle’s response `n.
Input: A probe matrix Gm, where m is the number of probed examples in each round.
Input: An oracle that reports f(Yn, Ŷn).
Output: The ground-truth labels Yn for all n examples.
for round r = 1, . . . , dn/me do
1. Set k ← (r − 1)×m.
2. Configure the probe matrix Ŷn:
• For i = 1, . . . , k (examples that have already been inferred), set ŷi to the inferred yi.
• For i = k + 1, . . . , k +m (the probed examples), set ŷi to the corresponding row of Gm.
• For i = k +m+ 1, . . . , n (examples that will remain uninferred), set ŷij to 1/c for all j.
3. Submit Ŷn to oracle and obtain `n.
4. Compute `m (the loss on just the m probed examples) according to Equation 3.
5. Determine the ground-truth of the probed examples by finding [yk+1, . . . ,yk+m]
> that minimizes .
end for
Note that, due to the finite floating-point resolution of the oracle’s return value, there is usually a
small difference between the `m that is calculated based on the oracle’s response and the true log-loss
value of the m probed examples. We call this difference the estimation error :

.
= |`m − f([ŷk+1, . . . , ŷk+m]>, [yk+1, . . . ,yk+m]>)|
4.1 How to choose the guesses of the probed examples
The key to exploiting the oracle so as to infer the ground-truth correctly is to choose the guesses Ŷn
so that `m reveals the labels of the probed examples uniquely. To simplify notation slightly, we let
Gm
.
= [ŷk+1, . . . , ŷk+m]
> – which we call the probe matrix – represent the contestant’s guesses for the
m probed examples. The probe matrix can stay the same across all submission rounds.
If the contestant’s guesses were real numbers in the mathematical sense – i.e., with infinite decimal
resolution – then Gm could be set to random values, constrained so that each row sums to 1. With
1In practice, competition oracles often enforce that each ŷij ∈ [γ, 1− γ] where is a small number such as γ = 1× 10−15; this
results in a negligible cost of k log(1− (c− 1)γ) for the second term. See Section 5.
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probability 1, the log-loss `m would then be unique over all possible instantiations of [yk+1, . . . ,yk+m]
>.
However, in practice, both the guesses and the log-loss reported by the oracle have finite precision, and
“collisions” – different values of the ground-truth that give rise to the same, or very similar, losses –
could occur. Consider, for example, the probe matrix below:
0.53595382 0.20743777 0.25660840
0.76336402 0.17982958 0.05680643
0.83539897 0.02825473 0.13634628
0.88845736 0.10858667 0.00295598

Here, no two elements are closer than 0.025 apart. Nonetheless, two possible values for the ground-truth
labeling Y4 result in log-loss values (approximately 1.18479 and 1.18488, respectively) that are less than
10−4 apart; these candidate labelings are
0 1 0
0 0 1
1 0 0
1 0 0
 and

1 0 0
0 1 0
1 0 0
0 1 0

If the oracle returned a log-loss of, say, 1.185, then it would be ambiguous which of the two values of Y4
was the correct one.
4.2 Collision avoidance
In order to avoid collisions, we need to choose Gm so that the minimum distance – over all possible
pairs of different ground-truth labelings of the m examples – is large enough so that even a floating-
point approximation of `m can uniquely identify the ground-truth. We can thus formulate a constrained
optimization problem in which we express the quality Q of Gm as:
Q(Gm)
.
= min
Ym 6=Y′m
|f(Ym,Gm)− f(Y′m,Gm)| (4)
where Ym,Y
′
m are distinct ground-truth labelings, and we wish to find
G∗m
.
= arg max
Gm
Q(Gm)
subject to the constraints that each row of Gm be a probability distribution. Optimization algorithms
do exist to solve constrained minimax and maximin problems [6, 3]; however, in practice, we encountered
numerical difficulties when using them (specifically, the MATLAB implementation in fminimax), whereby
the constraints at the end of optimization were not satisfied. Instead, we resorted to a heuristic that
is designed to sample the guesses ŷij so that the sum of the logarithms of a randomly chosen subset of
the guesses – one for each example i – is far apart within the range of 32-bit floating-point numbers. In
particular, we set ŷij = a× 10b and sampled a ∼ U([0, 1]) and b ∼ U({−14, 13, . . . ,−1, 0}) for each i and
each j < c. For j = c, we sampled a ∼ U([0, 1]) and b was fixed to 0. Finally, we normalized each ŷi so
that the entries sum to 1. Based on this heuristic, we used Monte-Carlo sampling (with approximately
10000 samples) to optimize the maximin expression above. In particular, for m = 6, we obtained a
matrix G6 for which Q(G6) = 0.00152. This number is substantially greater than the largest estimation
error we ever encountered during our attacks (see Section 6) and thus enabled us to conduct our attack
in batches of 6 probed excamples. However, for m = 7, we were never able to find a G7 for which the
RHS of Equation 4 above exceeded 0.0001.
5 Practical limit on number of probed examples m
The oracles in data-mining competitions such as Kaggle often impose a limit on the submitted proba-
bilities so that ŷij ∈ [γ, 1− γ] for each i, j, where γ is a small number such as 10−15. This ensures that
the log-loss is well defined (so that log 0 is never evaluated) but also indirectly imposes a limit on how
many examples m can be probed during each round. In particular, we can prove an upper bound on the
quality of a probe matrix Qm as a function of γ:
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Proposition 1. Let m be the number of probed examples and let c be the number of possible classes.
Let γ ∈ (0, 1) represent the minimum value, imposed by the oracle, of any guess ŷij. Then the quality
Q(Gm) of any probe matrix Gm is bounded above by
log(1−(c−1)γ)−log γ
cm−1 .
Proof. Since γ is the minimum value of any element in Gm, then 1 − (c − 1)γ is the maximum value.
Each of the m probed examples must therefore contribute at least − log(1− (c−1)γ) and at most − log γ
to the log-loss. Averaged over all m examples, the log-loss must therefore be in the closed interval
I
.
=
[
− 1
m
∑
i
log(1− (c− 1)γ), − 1
m
∑
i
log γ
]
= [− log(1− (c− 1)γ),− log γ]
Since there are c classes, then there are cm possible ground-truth labelings and corresponding log-losses.
The maximium value of Q(Gm) – i.e., the minimum distance, over all possible ground-truth labelings,
between corresponding log-loss values – is attained when the log-losses are distributed across I so that
the cm−1 “gaps” between consecutive pairs of log-loss values are equal in size. Therefore, the maximum
value of Q(Gm) is at most
δ =
log(1− (c− 1)γ)− log γ
cm − 1
Since δ decreases exponentially in m, and since δ must be kept larger than the maximum estimation
error  observed when executing Algorithm 1, then m must necessarily be kept small. As an example,
for m = 10, δ ≈ 5.8 × 10−4, and in practice we were not able to find satisfactory Gm even for m ≥ 7.
Nonetheless, even with m = 6, we were able to climb the leaderboard of a recent Kaggle competition
successfully.
6 Experiment: Kaggle Competition
We tested Algorithm 1 on the Intel & MobileODT Cervical Cancer Screening competition hosted by
Kaggle in May-June 2017. The objective of the competition was to develop an automatic classifier to
analyze cervical scans of women who are at-risk for cervical cancer and to predict the most effective
treatment based on the scan. Such a classifier could potentially save many lives, especially in rural
parts of the world in which high-quality medical care is lacking. During the first stage of the contest,
the competition website provided each contestant with training images (1821) and associated training
labels (with c = 3 categories), as well as testing images (n = 512). The goal of the competition was to
predict the test labels with high accuracy. To help competitors identify the most promising classification
methods, Kaggle provided an oracle – which each contestant could query up to 5 times per day – that
reported the log-loss on all 512 test examples without any added noise. After the first-stage submission
deadline (June 14, 2017), the second stage of the competition began, using a larger test set and an oracle
that reported the loss on only a fixed subset of the test samples.
Cheating during the first stage: Since the oracle during the first stage of the competition returned
the log-loss on the entire test set, it provided an ideal environment in which to demonstrate Algorithm
1. We performed the attack in phases according to the following procedure: For the first 2 queries, we
probed only a single test label (i.e., m = 1) just to verify that our code was working correctly. For the
next 30 queries, we probed m = 4 labels (using the G4 shown in the appendix). For the remaining queries
(after we had found G6 with large enough Q), we probed m = 6 examples per query. The maximum
estimation error , over all rounds, between the log-loss returned by the oracle and the loss calculated
based on the inferred ground-truth, was less than 0.0061. This was less than half of Q(G6) for the probe
matrix we used and thus allowed us to infer the ground-truth unambiguously. During the competition
we did not perform any supervised learning of cervical scan images (i.e., the intended purpose of the
competition) whatsoever.
Results: The progression of our attack is shown in Figure 1. In short, with less than 100 oracle
queries (well within the limit given the total duration of the competition), we were able to infer the
ground-truth labels of all the test examples perfectly. We note that, during consecutive iterations of the
attack, the attained log-loss need not always decrease – this is because the the reduction in loss due to
inferring more examples can sometimes be dwarfed by an increase in loss due to which specific entries of
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Figure 1: Climbing the Kaggle leaderboard, using the proposed log-loss oracle exploitation algorithm, of
the Intel & MobileODT Cervical Cancer Screening 2017 competition (first stage). During the first 32 oracle
queries, the labels of m = 4 test examples were ascertained during each round. Afterwards, a more aggressive
(m = 6) approach was used to descend the log-loss curve more quickly. After 98 rounds of Algorithm 1, we
were able to infer all 512 test labels correctly, achieved a loss of 0.00000, and climbed the leaderboard to
rank #4 out of 848 (for the first stage of the competition).
Gm are selected by the corresponding ground-truth of the probed examples. Nevertheless, the proposed
attack is able to recover perfectly all m probed labels during every round. The progression of (usually
decreasing) log-loss values `n are plotted in Figure 1 (left). By the last iteration, we had recovered the
ground-truth values of all 512 examples correctly and thus attained a loss of 0.00000. Since we were
tied with several other contestants who also achieved the same loss – whether by legitimate means or by
cheating – we were ranked in 4th place on the first-stage leaderboard (see Figure 1 (right)).
Second stage: During the second stage of the same Kaggle competition, the organizers created a
larger test set that included the 512 test examples from the first-stage as a subset. Moreover, these
same 512 examples were the basis of both the oracle results and the leaderboard rankings up until the
conclusion of the second-stage competition. Hence, for a brief period of about two weeks, we were able to
maintain the illusion of a top-ranked Kaggle competitor achieving a perfect score. To be clear: the final,
definitive results of the competition (announced on June 21, 2017) – including who won the $100,000
prize money – were based on the log-loss on the entire test set, not just the subset. Naturally, our
ranking declined precipitously at this point (to 225th place out of 848 contenders) since our guesses on
the remaining 75% examples were just 1/c.
7 Cheating when the Oracle Reports Accuracy on a Subset
of Examples
It is more common in data-mining competitions for the oracle to report accuracy only on a subset of the
test set. Here we describe how a contestant can still cheat, using similar methods as described above,
when the oracle reports accuracy on a fixed subset of examples (i.e., the same subset for each oracle
query). In this setting, the contestant submits a matrix Ŷn with n rows, but the log-loss obtained from
the oracle is based on only s ≤ n examples. Note that, in contrast to Algorithm 1, here we treat “already
inferred” examples in the same way as the “uninferred” examples – we assign their guesses ŷij = 1/c
for all i, j (instead of setting them to their inferred values). The only drawback of this simplification
is that the attacker cannot simultaneously infer the ground-truth and decrease her/his log-loss (in the
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manner illustrated by Figure 1) – rather, the contestant must wait until after she/he has inferred the
ground-truth to “cash in” and jump to a higher leaderboard rank. We describe the new attack below:
Determining the size of the subset s: The first step of the attack is to determine the value of
s. To this end, it is useful to identify a single test example that is definitely in the s-element subset on
which the oracle reports accuracy. Finding such an example can be achieved by setting the guesses ŷij to
1/c for all but one example and setting the guesses to random values (but not equal to 1/c) for a single
“probe” example i. If the loss reported by the oracle is not equal to − log c, then the probe example
must be one of the s evaluated examples; otherwise, another example is chosen and the procedure is
repeated. Assuming that the fraction s/n is not too small, then this procedure should only take a few
oracle queries.
Given a single example at index i that is known to be among the s evaluated examples, along with
the log-loss value `s, the contestant can determine s. To see how, notice that the s−1 examples that are
not example i contribute a log-loss of s−1
s
log c, and that example i contributes − 1
s
yij log ŷij . Therefore,
the contestant can iterate (jointly) over all n possible values for s ∈ {1, . . . , n} and all c possible values
of yi to find
arg min
s
{
min
yi
∣∣∣∣∣1s
(
(s− 1)× log c−
∑
j
yij log ŷij
)
− `s
∣∣∣∣∣
}
(5)
The solution is the number of examples s on which the oracle reports the log-loss. We note that, in
practice, due to finite resolution of the oracle’s response and the contestant’s guesses, the inferred value
of s can sometimes be inaccurate. Nevertheless, even an imperfect estimate of s can often be used to
infer the ground-truth of the s evaluated test examples with high accuracy (see simulation results below).
Inferring the labels of a batch of probe examples: Now that s has been inferred, the contestant
can probe the labels of m examples at a time. To infer Ym, the contestant must consider whether each
probed example i is in the s-element subset on which the oracle reports the log-loss. To this end, we
define z ∈ {0, 1}m so that zi is 1 if example i is in the s-element subset and 0 otherwise. The L1-norm
‖z‖1 of this vector thus equals the number of probed examples that are also in the s-element subset, and
we can compute the contribution of the probed examples to the log-loss as − 1
s
∑
i
∑
j ziyij log ŷij . The
remaining log-loss is accounted for by the (s−‖z‖1) “uninferred” examples and amounts to s−‖z‖1s log c.
Therefore, to determine Ym and z, the contestant must optimize
arg min
Ym
{
min
z∈{0,1}m
∣∣∣∣∣
(
−1
s
∑
i
∑
j
ziyij log ŷij +
s− ‖z‖1
s
log c
)
− `n
∣∣∣∣∣
}
(6)
using brute-force search (which is easy since m is small). Naturally, row i of the inferred matrix Ym is
valid only if zi = 1.
Choosing the guesses: Similar to Section 4.2, we need to optimize the probe matrix so as to
to minimize collisions. In this setting, however, we must be concerned not just with different possible
ground-truth labelings Ym, but also with the indicator variables z – both of which “select” different
elements ŷij to add to the log-loss. We thus revise the quality function to maximize the minimum
distance, over all distinct pairs Ym 6= Y′m and all all distinct pairs z 6= z′, of the corresponding log-loss
values (see Appendix).
7.1 Simulation
Instead of applying the algorithm above to the Intel-MobileODT competition2, we conducted a simula-
tion. In particular, we simulated a test set containing n = 2048 examples (from c = 3 classes) where
s = 512 evaluated examples was randomly sampled (but fixed over all oracle queries) across the entire
test set. The simulated contestant first probed just single examples until it could infer s (using Equation
5). The contestant then proceeded to submit batches of m = 4 probed examples (for dn/me total rounds)
and infer their labels based on the oracle’s response by optimizing Equation 6 using exhaustive search.
To assess how the floating-point resolution p of the oracle’s response impacts the accuracy of the
labels inferred by the contestant, we varied p ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, where p was the number of digits after
the decimal point. (p = 1 means that the oracle’s responses were rounded to the nearest 0.1; p = 2
2 The oracle in the second stage of the Intel-MobileODT 2017 competition evaluated only a subset of the test examples, but
it turned out that this subset was exactly the 512 images from the first-stage test set; hence, there was nothing new to infer.
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to the nearest 0.01, etc.) For each p value, we conducted 100 simulations. As the probe matrix for all
simulations, we used G˜4 (see appendix). At the end of each simulation, we computed the accuracy of
the inferred labels versus ground-truth, and then averaged the accuracy rate over all 100 simulations.
Results: Accuracy of inferred labels increased with higher floating-point resolution, as expected. For
p = 1, the mean accuracy was 38.8%, which was still slightly higher than the expected baseline guess
accuracy (≈ 33.33%). For p = 2, mean accuracy was 47.8%; for p = 3, 59.4%; for p = 4, 78.7%; and for
p = 5, 93.6%. In many simulations, the contestant’s best inference of s – the exact number of evaluated
examples in the test set that is needed in Equation 6 – was incorrect, and yet many (and often most) of
the inferred test labels were still correct. In fact, the average correlation (over all values of p) between the
mean absolute error between the inferred s and its true value, and the accuracy of the inferred test labels
w.r.t. ground-truth, was only −.107 – suggesting that correct inference of the test labels is relatively
robust to errors in inference of s.
8 Conclusion
We derived an algorithm whereby a contestant can illicitly improve her/his leaderboard score in a data-
mining competition by exploiting information provided by an oracle that reports the log-loss of the
contestant’s guesses w.r.t. the ground-truth labels of the test set. We also showed that the number m
of test examples whose labels can be inferred in each round of the attack is fundamentally limited by
the floating-point resolution of the contestant’s guesses. Nevertheless, the attack is practical, and we
demonstrated it on a recent Kaggle competition and thereby attained a leaderboard ranking of #4 out of
848 (for the first stage of the contest), without ever even downloading the training or testing data. For
more general scenarios in which the oracle reports the log-loss on only a fixed subset of test examples, we
derived a second algorithm and demonstrated it in simulation. In terms of practical implications, our
findings suggest that data-mining competitions should evaluate contestants based only on test examples
that the loss/accuracy oracle never examined.
Appendix: Probe Matrices Gm
For the experiment in Section 6, we used the matrices G6 and G4 shown below (note that e here means
“times 10 to the power. . . ”):
G4 =

3.17090802e-01 6.03843391e-01 7.90658068e-02
3.34653412e-01 6.64893789e-01 4.52799011e-04
4.44242183e-01 5.42742523e-01 1.30152938e-02
3.02254057e-01 1.41415552e-01 5.56330391e-01
 and Q(G4) = 0.019248
G6 =

3.72716316e-13 3.17270110e-06 9.99996841e-01
4.03777185e-11 2.98306441e-06 9.99997020e-01
1.51235222e-11 9.45069790e-02 9.05493021e-01
7.54659835e-10 6.77224932e-07 9.99999344e-01
1.84318694e-09 2.37398371e-01 7.62601614e-01
9.75336131e-12 1.44393380e-06 9.99998569e-01
 and Q(G6) = 0.001526
For the simulation in Section 7, we defined a new quality function
Q˜(G˜m)
.
= min
zm,
Ym 6=Y′m
|f˜(zm,Ym,Gm)− f˜(zm,Y′m,Gm)|
where
f˜(zm,Ym, Ŷm) = − 1
m
∑
i
∑
j
ziyij log ŷij
In our simulated attack against the oracle, we used:
G˜4 =

3.34296189e-02 6.06806998e-06 9.66564298e-01
6.80901580e-15 8.52564275e-02 9.14743602e-01
1.78242549e-01 2.03901175e-12 8.21757436e-01
1.22676250e-02 1.40922994e-03 9.86323118e-01
 and Q˜(G˜4) = 0.012750
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